This paper investigates strategic motives of macroeconomic forecasters and the effect of their professional affiliations. "Wishful expectations hypothesis" suggests that a forecaster predicts what his employer wishes. "Publicity hypothesis" argues that, since forecasters are evaluated by accuracy and ability to generate publicity, forecasters in industries that emphasize publicity most will make most extreme and least accurate predictions. "Signaling hypothesis" asserts that an extreme forecast signals confidence in own ability, because incompetent forecasters would mimic others to avoid public notice. Empirical evidence from a twenty-four-year panel of annual GDP forecasts is consistent with the publicity hypothesis only. Implication to the rationality test is discussed. JEL Classification Codes: E37; C53; D84.
Introduction
Over the last few decades, rationality of macroeconomic forecasts has been the subject of controversy. The empirical evidence is totally mixed: while some studies find bias and inefficiency, 1 others do not. 2 The conclusions of these analyses, however, rely on the crucial assumption that forecasters aim to minimize expected squared forecast errors.
This assumption might be at variance with the reality, because there are various reasons for rational forecasters to announce forecasts different from the conditional expected value. Ito (1990) analyzes yen-dollar exchange rate forecasts and finds industry-specific bias in the direction that would benefit the forecaster's employer ("wishful expectations hypothesis"). Laster, Bennett, and Geoum (1999) develop a model of rational forecast bias in which forecasters compromise accuracy to gain publicity for their firms. The model predicts that, the more the forecaster's wage depends on publicity, the more extreme and the less accurate his forecast is ("publicity hypothesis"). Ashiya and Doi (2001) argue that incompetent forecasters try to reduce the risk of an extremely low reputation by mimicking other forecasters, and hence a person whose forecast is different from others must have confidence in own ability ("signaling hypothesis").
Little is known, however, about the validity of these hypotheses. Pons-Novell (2003) finds industry-specific bias in the U.S. unemployment rate forecasts, but this result is difficult to interpret as the evidence for the wishful expectations hypothesis. 3 Furthermore, Laster et al. fail to find evidence for this hypothesis in the growth rate forecasts. As for the publicity hypothesis, the empirical test of Laster et al. is incomplete, 4 and there is no other empirical study on it. Ehrbeck and Waldman (1996) and Ashiya (2003) analyze the rationality of forecast revisions, and reject the signaling hypothesis. Their results, however, might be marred by the publicity effect.
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This paper examines these three hypotheses using a twenty-four-year panel of annual GDP forecasts. Section 2 explains the data, and Section 3 shows the results. As for the actual growth rate , Keane and Runkle (1990) argue that the revised data introduces a systematic bias because the extent of revision is unpredictable for the forecasters (See also Stark and Croushore (2002) ). For this reason we use the initial announcement of the Japanese government usually released in June.
The Japanese economy experienced four business cycles in our sample period: the peaks were 1984, 1990, 1996, and 2000, and the troughs were 1981, 1986, 1993, 1998, and 2001. 7 3. Results 3-1. Wishful expectations hypothesis Ito (1990) analyzes a survey data of yen-dollar exchange rate expectations, and finds that there are "wishful expectations" among forecasters: Japanese exporters expect a yen depreciation (relative to others), and Japanese importers expect a yen appreciation.
As for the GDP forecast, security firms and insurance companies wish strong growth (relative to other institutions), because it stimulates sales of stocks and insurance. 
) denotes the year dummy and .
( )
We add the year dummies to control on specific factors in each year. If is positive, forecasters in industry j tend to be more optimistic than those in the trading companies.
The wishful expectations hypothesis predicts j β S β and I β to be significantly positive.
The same regression is also considered for year-ahead forecast. Table 1 is the dummy for research institutions in year-ahead forecast. The dummies for security firms and insurance companies are not significantly positive.
Therefore the wishful expectations hypothesis is not supported by our data. One possible explanation for this result is that security firms and insurance companies in reality are indifferent to the growth rates so that they do not form distinctively optimistic expectations.
3.2 Publicity hypothesis Laster et al. (1999) assume that forecasters' wages are based on both their accuracy and their ability to generate publicity for their firms. The most accurate forecaster in a given period gains media exposure, which is more effective than a paid advertisement in attracting new clients to the firm. The chance of winning extensive publicity, however, decreases as the number of similar forecasts increases. Each forecaster thus has an incentive to differentiate his forecast from others at the price of forecast accuracy.
Their model implies that forecasters working in industries that offer the greatest relative reward for publicity will make predictions that are most extreme and least accurate. Namely the model indicates (H1) reward for publicity and extremeness of forecasts are positively correlated, and (H2) reward for publicity and accuracy of forecasts are negatively correlated.
Consequently, (H3) accuracy and extremeness of forecasts are negatively correlated.
To establish this "publicity hypothesis", at least two of (H1), (H2), and (H3) must be confirmed. Since Laster et al. have tested only (H1), their empirical method is imperfect and unsatisfactory. This paper examines all three hypotheses in order.
We expect that those who work for research institutions benefit relatively more from favorable publicity, and hence they produce extreme and inaccurate forecasts. On the other hand, trading companies will use economic forecasts for internal planning purpose and therefore emphasize accuracy. Banks, securities firms, and insurance companies occupy an intermediate position.
First we examine (H1) by the following regression: 
DEV , is the absolute forecast deviation from the mean forecast. If is positive, forecasters in industry j tend to make forecasts more different from the consensus than those in the trading companies do. We expect j β R β to be significantly positive.
The results in Table 2 clearly support (H1): the coefficients for the research-institutions dummy are significantly positive in both current-year and year-ahead forecasts. It indicates that the research institutions on average release more extreme forecasts compared with the trading companies. For other industries, the coefficient for the securities-firms dummy in year-ahead forecast is significantly positive. This result will be used in the test of (H3).
Next we examine (H2) by the following regression:
( ) This result offers considerable support of (H2). For other industries, the coefficient for the securities-firms dummy in current-year forecast is significantly negative. This result will be used in the test of (H3).
R β
Finally, we test (H3) by the joint result of As for the banks and the insurance companies, no coefficient is significantly different from zero. As for the securities firms in current-year forecast, the coefficient in Table 3 is significantly negative but that in Table 2 is not significant. As for the securities firms in year-ahead forecast, the coefficient in Table 2 is significantly positive but that in Table 3 is not significant. As for the research institutions, all coefficients are positive. Therefore the results in Table 2 and 3 are consistent with (H3).
Since all of (H1), (H2), and (H3) are supported, our empirical results validate the publicity hypothesis.
3-3. Signaling hypothesis Doi (1999, 2001) 
β is significantly positive for both current-year and year-ahead forecasts, which is in contradiction to the "signaling hypothesis".
One might argue that the "publicity effect" has blurred out the "signaling effect" in the above regression. As we saw in Section 3-2, the publicity hypothesis implies that forecast accuracy and extremeness of forecasts are negatively correlated (See (H3)).
That is, 
If firms in industry j offer similar relative reward for publicity, then the publicity effect must be negligible and the signaling effect must prevail within industry j. Therefore we expect to be significantly negative. Unfortunately, their approach is not free from contamination of the publicity effect.
Suppose that extremeness of the final forecast is more important for generating publicity than that of the initial forecast. Then those who are rewarded for publicity will release extreme final forecasts (at the price of accuracy), but they will not distort their initial forecasts. Consequently their forecast revisions will be larger than others, leading to a positive correlation between the degree of forecast revision and forecast error. Since the signaling hypothesis predicts a negative correlation, the joint effect on the sign of the correlation is indeterminate. This is an important caveat against the results of Ehrbeck and Waldman (1996) and Ashiya (2003) .
Our method is complementary to theirs, and has the added advantage: by taking account of the professional affiliations of the forecasters, it succeeds in controlling the publicity effect and isolating the signaling effect.
Conclusions
This paper has examined three strategic motives of macroeconomic forecasters by a twenty-four-year panel of annual GDP forecasts. "Wishful expectations hypothesis"
suggests forecasters distort their predictions in the direction that would benefit their employers, but we have not found such tendencies. "Signaling hypothesis" argues that competent forecasters signal confidence in own ability by differentiating their forecasts from others, and that we would observe a negative correlation between the absolute forecast error and the degree of forecast extremeness. This assertion, however, is unequivocally rejected by the data.
"Publicity hypothesis" predicts that, since forecasters' wages are based on both their accuracy and their ability to generate publicity for their firms, forecasters in industries that emphasize publicity most will make most extreme and least accurate forecasts. We have made thorough investigation into this hypothesis, and have confirmed it for the first time.
Our result indicates that rational forecasters compromise accuracy to gain publicity for their firms. Since they have objectives other than minimizing expected forecast errors, predictable bias in forecasts may not be the sign of irrationality. Therefore the unbiasedness test and the efficiency test, which are common in the literature, are biased toward rejecting the rational expectations hypothesis.
To eliminate the publicity effect from the rationality test, we must take account of the professional affiliations of the survey participants. Whether the publicity effect is observed in other forecasts is an important topic for future research.
2. Holden and Peel (1985) , Keane and Runkle (1990) , Dua (1991), Joutz and Stekler (2000) , Oller and Barot (2000) , and Ashiya (forthcoming).
3. More specifically, Pons-Novell (2003) finds (1) the dummy for miscellaneous institutions is significantly positive and (2) the dummy for the investment banking is significantly negative. However, the first result is difficult to interpret because all of the government, Federal Reserve, insurance companies, and labor organizations are classified into this category. The relevance of the second result to the wishful expectations hypothesis is also unclear because we do not know whether the investment banks benefit from low unemployment rates more than the government or the commercial banks do.
4. We will discuss this issue in Section 3-2.
5. We will review their findings and discuss the possible effect of the publicity hypothesis in Section 3-3.
6. We obtain the same results by using the revised data of released in June of year
7. The initial announcements of the actual growth rates for fiscal years 1980 to 2003 were 3.8%, 2.7%, 3.3%, 3.7%, 5.7%, 4.2%, 2.6%, 4.9%, 5.1%, 5.0%, 5.7%, 3.5%, 0.8%, 0.0%, 0.6%, 2.3%, 3.0%, -0.7%, -2.0%, 0.5%, 0.9%, -1.3%, 1.6%, and 3.2%. 
